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[This article provides a comparative overview of issues pertaining 
to the stolen generation in Canada and Australia. It includes a 
historical overview of the removal and detaining of aboriginal 
children in Canada and Australia. As a consequence of the 
revelations of this past practice, litigation has been undertaken by 
members of the stolen generations in both Canada and Australia. 
The article includes a summary of the key cases in Canada and 
Australia. Unlike in Australia, some Canadian aboriginal claimants 
have successfully brought actions for compensation against the 
federal Canadian government for the damages stemming from their 
experiences in the aboriginal residential schools. In the course of 
this discussion, the various causes of actions relied upon by the 
plaintiffs are examined. While the plaintiffs in these leading 
Canadian cases were ultimately successful under at least one of 
their heads of claim, the approaches in these cases in regard to the 
Crown’s liability for breaching fiduciary duties, the duty of care, 
and non-delegable duties is inconsistent. Thus even in regard to the 
Canadian jurisprudence key legal issues pertaining to the Crown’s 
liability for the aboriginal residential school experience continues to 
be unresolved.] 
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I INTRODUCTION 
 
The common policy of the Australian1 and Canadian2 governments3 of 
removing aboriginal children from their families and placing them in  
 
                                                 
1 See especially the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (‘HREOC’) 
Report, Bringing them Home; Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families (1997). See also 
Anthony Austin, Never Trust a Government Man: Northern Territory Aboriginal Policy 
1911-1939 (1997); Paul Batley, ‘The State’s Fiduciary Duty to the Stolen Generations’ 
(1996) 2 Australian  Journal of Human Rights 177; Antonio Buti, Separated: Australian 
Aboriginal Childhood Separations and Guardianship Law (2004); Julie Cassidy, ‘Case 
Comment: Cubillo v The Commonwealth: A Denial of the Stolen Generation?’ (2003) 
12:1 Griffith Law Review 114; Julie Cassidy, ‘The Stolen Generation: A Breach of 
Fiduciary Duties? Canadian v Australian approaches to fiduciary duties’ (2003) 34:2 
University of Ottawa Law Review 175; Julie Cassidy, ‘In the best interests of the child? 
The stolen generations – Canada and Australia’ (2006) Griffith Law Review 
(forthcoming); Jennifer Clarke ‘Case Note: Cubillo v Commonwealth’ (2001) 25 
Melbourne University Law Review 218; Barbara Cummings, Jenny Blokland and Rebecca 
La Forgia, ‘Lessons from the Stolen Generations Litigation’ (1997) 19 Adelaide Law 
Review 25; Martin Flynn and Sue Stanton, ‘Trial by Ordeal: The Stolen Generation in 
Court’ (2000) 25 Alternative Law Journal 71; Anna Haebich, Broken Circles: 
Fragmenting Indigenous Families 1800-2000 (2001); Rosalind Kidd, Black Lives, 
Government Lies (2nd ed, 2003); Rosalind Kidd The Way We Civilise: Aboriginal Affairs – 
The Untold Story (1997); Link-Up (NSW) Aboriginal Corporation, In the Best Interests of 
the Child? (1996); Robert Manne, ‘In Denial; The Stolen Generations and the Right’ 
(2001) The Australian Quarterly Essay 1; Leslie Marchant, Aboriginal Administration in 
Western Australia 1886-1905 (1981); Pamela O’Connor, ‘History of Trial: Cubillo and 
Gunner v The Commonwealth of Australia’ (2001) 26 Alternative Law Journal 27; Janet 
Ransley and Elena Marchetti, ‘The Hidden Whiteness of Australian Law’ (2001) Griffith 
Law Review 139;  Peter Read, The Stolen Generation: The Removal of Aboriginal 
Children in New South Wales 1883-1969 (1982); Senate Legal and Constitutional 
References Committee, Healing: A Legacy of Generations (2000); Robert Van Krieken, 
‘Is assimilation justiciable? Lorna Cubillo & Peter Gunner v Commonwealth’ (2001) 23 
Sydney Law Review 239. 
2 See especially Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples Final Report (1998) 
(‘RCAP’). See also Statement of Reconciliation: Learning from the Past, 7 January 
1998; Indian Residential Schools Resolution Department (‘IRSR’), ‘Key Events’ and 
‘The Residential school System Historical Overview’, www.irsr-rqpi.gc.ca; 
Aboriginal Healing Foundation, The Healing Has Begun: An Operational Update 
from the Aboriginal Healing Foundation, May 2002; Julie Cassidy, ‘A Legacy of 
Assimilation: Abuse in Canadian Aboriginal Residential Schools’ (2003) 7 Southern 
Cross University Law Review 154.  
2006                                                            The Stolen Generations 133 
 
institutions is now well documented.4 A key5 basis for such removals was a 
policy of assimilation.6 The underlying idea was that by removing aboriginal 
children from their families the government could break the child’s connection 
with their family, aboriginal culture and traditional land and ultimately they  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                    
3 Note, as the policy of removing aboriginal children from their families pre-dated 
federation, State governments initially promulgated the policy. For example, under 
the Aboriginal Protection Act 1869 (Vic) the Board for the Protection of Aborigines 
was established and under the Act the Governor could order the removal of any 
aboriginal child from their family and their placement in reformatory or industrial 
schools. Similarly, under the Aboriginal Protection and Restriction of the Sale of 
Opium Act 1897 (Qld) the Chief Protector of Aborigines was authorised to remove 
aboriginal children from their families and place them in dormitories. Post federation 
the policy continued to be furthered by the State governments as the 
Commonwealth’s legislative powers over ‘race’ (Constitution Act 1901 (UK) s 
51(xxvi)) excluded the ‘aboriginal race’. It was not until 1967, pursuant to a national 
referendum amending the Commonwealth Constitution, that the federal government 
obtained legislative powers over aboriginal affairs. Nevertheless, through the 
Commonwealth government’s control of the Northern Territory pursuant to 
Constitution Act 1901 (UK) s 122 and its co-ordination of State and Commonwealth 
aboriginal affairs, discussed briefly below, from this date the federal government 
played a primary role in promoting this policy of assimilation. 
4 A similar assimilation policy of removing Indian children from their families existed 
in the United States of America. To date there has, however, been no litigation of the 
relevant legal issues except in regard to the preliminary issue whether Indian plaintiffs 
must first seek to have their cases resolved administratively by the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs. The court has held that the administrative resolution process must be gone 
through first, before a claim can be made through the judicial system: Zephier v 
United States (29 October, 2004). 
5 It will be suggested that assimilation was not the sole impetus in Australia for the 
removal of aboriginal children from their families. Two further matters that prompted 
this policy was pressure from pastoralists for the governments to provide them with 
cheap labour (particularly farmhands) and to dispossess aboriginal communities to 
facilitate the expansion of European settlement in Australia. See further Julie Cassidy, 
‘In the best interests of the child? The Stolen Generations – Canada and Australia’ 
(2006) Griffith Law Review (forthcoming). 
6 In regard to Australia see http://slq.qld.gov.au/ils/100years/assimilation.htm; 
Cubillo & Gunner v The Commonwealth [2000] FCA 1084 (Cubillo 2) in particular 
[1146]. See also Cubillo 2 [2000] FCA 1084, [158], [160], [162], [226], [233], [235], 
[251] and [257]; Williams v The Minister No 2 [1999] NSWSC 843, [88]. In regard to 
Canada see RCAP, above n 2, 335. See further RCAP, above n 2 and Aboriginal 
Healing Foundation, above n 2. 
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would be assimilated into white society.7 In Australia the focus was 
particularly on aboriginal children of mixed parentage.8 Thus, whilst this policy 
predated 1937, in that year it was resolved at the first conference of the 
Commonwealth and State Aboriginal Authorities that the ‘destiny of the 
natives of aboriginal origin, but not of full blood, lies in their ultimate 
absorption by the people of the Commonwealth and it therefore recommends 
that all efforts be directed to that end.’9 The term ‘stolen generation’10 is now 
commonly used in Australia to describe those children who were forcibly  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 In regard to Australia see Cubillo 2 ibid [172]-[179], [190] and [1146;] Bain 
Attwood, The Making of the Aborigines (1989), 16-17; HREOC, above n 1, 9; Kaye 
Healey (ed) The Stolen Generation (1998) 91 Issues in Society, 17, 23 and 32. At the 
first Conference of Commonwealth and State Aboriginal Authorities, held in 
Canberra on 21 to 23 April 1937, it was resolved that such separation and absorption 
into white society was the answer to the ‘aboriginal problem’: National Report 
Volume 2 – The Assimilation Years (www.austlii.edu.au/ 
cgibin/dsip.pl/au/other/IndigLRes/rciadic/national/vol2/278.html). See also Cubillo 2 
ibid [158], [160], [162], [226], [233], [235], [251] and [257]; Williams v The Minister 
(No 2) ibid [88]. In regard to Canada see RCAP, above n 2, 335. See further RCAP, 
above n 2 and Aboriginal Healing Foundation, above n 2. 
8 Healey, ibid 19, 23-24 and 33; Antonio Buti, Separated: Australian Aboriginal 
Childhood Separations and Guardianship Law (2004) at 49. The children were 
referred to as ‘half-caste’, ‘quadroons’ or ‘octoroons’ based on the perceived 
percentage of aboriginal/European blood; such being effectively determined on the 
child’s complexion. It had been suggested that ‘full blooded’ aboriginal persons 
would die out. See the discussion of the first Conference of Commonwealth and State 
Aboriginal Authorities, held in Canberra on 21 to 23 April 1937 where the conference 
was unanimous that ‘full blood’ aboriginals would ultimately die out: Healey ibid and 
Lorna Lippmann, Generations of Resistance: Aborigines Demand Justice (2nd ed 
1992), 24. See also HREOC, above n 1, 32. 
9 Resolution passed at the first Conference of Commonwealth and State Aboriginal 
Authorities (21-23 April 1937). Whilst this policy and the focus of part-aboriginal 
children predated this point, this resolution was an historical watershed in this regard. 
See also the Report of the Administrator dated 28 February 1952 to the Secretary, 
Department of Territories in Canberra, quoted by O’Loughlin J in Cubillo 2 [2000] 
FCA 1084, [226]. See also the discussion of the first Conference of Commonwealth 
and State Aboriginal Authorities, held in Canberra on 21 to 23 April 1937 in  Healey 
(ed) ibid 23-24. 
10 Apparently Read coined this term: Peter Read, The Stolen Generation: The 
Removal of Aboriginal Children in New South Wales 1883-1969 (1982). 
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removed from their families under this policy. In Canada no distinction was 
drawn between children on the basis of mixed parentage.11 Rather the 
legislative focus was on ‘Status’ Indian children.12  
 
Despite the legislative focus on Status Indians, other Canadian aboriginal 
children such as Inuit13 and Metis14 children were also removed from their 
families and detained in the institutions pursuant to this policy. The schools 
where Canadian aboriginal children were taken and detained are known as 
Indian15 or aboriginal16 residential schools.  
 
Whilst the removal of part-aboriginal children from their families had been 
documented in Australia for many decades, the policy was not really debated in 
the public domain until the findings of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal 
Deaths in Custody.17 The Commission found that of the 99 deaths investigated, 
43 of the persons had, as children, been separated from their families and  
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Under the Indian Act 1894 and successive legislation the government was 
authorised to require attendance by Indian children at aboriginal residential schools. 
The focus was not on percentage of blood. 
12 That is, persons registered as Indians under the Indian Act. 
13 In the 1950s, as greater incursions were made into the Artic areas, Residential 
schools became more established in these areas and the number of Inuit children in 
such schools substantially increased: RCAP, above n 2, 351-352; Cassidy, above n 2, 
161. 
14 As a consequence of many Metis living on reservations with Status Indians, some 
Metis children were also forced to attend the Residential schools. See RCAP above n 
2, 351-352; Sara Hansen and Marcus Lee, The Impact of Residential schools and 
Other Institutions on the Metis People of Saskatchewan: Cultural Genocide, 
Systematic Abuse and Child Abuse, A Report Written for the Law Commission of 
Canada (1999); Cassidy, ibid 161-162. See also www.metisnation.ca.  
15 Note in this regard that in response to RCAP the Canadian government established 
within the Indian and Northern Affairs Department the Indian Residential Schools 
Resolution Unit, with responsibility to manage issues pertaining to these schools. In 
time the Unit became a new government Department, independent of the Indian and 
Northern Affairs Department: IRSR, above n 3. 
16 The author prefers the term aboriginal residential schools as the children taken and 
placed in the schools were not all Status Indians, but also included Inuit and Metis 
children. See Hansen and Lee, above n 14. See also www.metisnation.ca. 
17 Report of the Inquiry into the Death of Malcolm Charles Smith of the Royal 
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (1989). 
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communities.18 However, it was not until the revelations of the Australian 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (‘HREOC’) Report, 
Bringing them Home19 that the general Australian public became truly aware of 
the removal policy.20 The Report made 54 recommendations, including 
acknowledgment of the past policy and a government apology. This in turn led 
to public calls for a government apology. Whilst State and Territory 
governments responded with an apology for such removals and the consequent 
hurt and distress,21 the Federal parliament merely passed a motion of sincere 
regret.22 Moreover, as noted below, the government has vigorously defended  
 
 
 
                                                 
18 See Healey, above n 7, 12. Note also the significance of the address of then Prime 
Minister, Mr Paul Keating, in Sydney on 10 December 1992 when he acknowledged 
‘We took the children from their mothers’ (reproduced: (1993) 2 Aboriginal Law 
Bulletin 4, 4.) 
19 HREOC, above n 1. 
20 The relatively recent release of the film Rabbit Proof Fences also served to 
heighten the public awareness both in Australia and Canada. The film was written and 
produced by Christine Olsen and is based on the 1996 book of the same name, 
authored by Doris Pilkington Garimara. The author tells the story of how in the 
1930’s her mother, Molly, 14, her sister, Daisy, 8, and their cousin, Gracie, 10, were 
taken from their homes on the instruction of the Chief Protector of Aborigines and 
sent to the Moore River Native Settlement, 2,400km south. The girls escaped the 
authorities and followed the rabbit proof fence that then crossed the Continent back to 
their homes, located near the rabbit fence at Jigalong, on the edge of the Gibson 
Desert. 
21 For example, in response the Queensland Parliament passed a resolution of regret 
and apology for ‘past policies under which indigenous children were forcibly 
separated from their families’: (Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative 
Assembly, 26 May 1999, 1947-1982). The South Australian parliament also passed a 
resolution of sincere regret and apology, for ‘the forced separation of some Aboriginal 
children from their families and homes’: (South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, 
House of Assembly, 28 May 1997, 1435-1443).  The Victorian parliament apologised 
‘for the past policies under which Aboriginal children were removed from their 
families and express[ed] deep regret at the hurt and distress this has caused and 
reaffirm[ed] its support for reconciliation between all Australians’: (Victoria, 
Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 17 September 1997, 10). The 
Assembly of the Australian Capital Territory passed a resolution of apology noting 
that it regarded ‘the past practices of forced separation as abhorrent’: (Australian 
Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 17 June 1997, 
1604).  
22 Hansard, House of Representatives, 26 August 1999. 
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compensation claims in the courts and has made no attempt to negotiate a 
compensation package for aboriginal persons who were removed from their 
families, including those who were abused while being detained.23 
 
Similarly in Canada, it was not until the revelations of the Royal Commission 
on Aboriginal Peoples Final Report (1998) (RCAP)24 that the Canadian general 
public became aware of the plight of the children, now adults, who had been 
removed under this policy and so often abused25 while in the care of the 
relevant institution. However, unlike the Australian federal government, the 
Canadian federal government’s response to the revelations was, inter alia, an 
apology to those persons who suffered through the aboriginal residential 
schools.26 On 7 January 1998 the government delivered its Statement of 
Reconciliation: Learning from the Past. The federal government acknowledged 
its role in the development and administration of aboriginal residential schools 
and apologised to those persons who suffered through the schools. Whilst the 
apology emphasises sorrow for those who suffered physical and sexual abuse, 
‘the worst cases’, it also notes this ‘system separated many children from their 
families and communities and prevented them from speaking their own 
languages and from learning about their heritage and cultures.’ The apology 
acknowledged that ‘policies that sought to assimilate Aboriginal people, 
women and men, were not the way to build a strong country.’ More recently, in 
the 20 November 2005 agreement between Canada and the Assembly of First 
Nations,27 the government acknowledged that it and certain religious  
 
                                                 
23 One in six of the witnesses before the Bringing them Home Inquiry reported being 
physically assaulted while detained in aboriginal institutions and one in ten asserted 
that they had been sexually abused: Healey, above n 7, 19. 
24 RCAP, above n 2, chap 10 provides detailed information regarding the aboriginal 
residential schools. The Report recommended, inter alia, the establishment of a 
Public Inquiry into the aboriginal residential schools. It also recommended the 
establishment of a National Repository of records and video collections related to 
aboriginal residential schools. 
25 Note, it has been suggested that in some schools all children were sexually abused: 
‘Reports of sexual abuse may be low, expert says’ The Globe Mail, 1 June 1990, A3 
reporting the comments of Rix Rogers, special adviser to the Minister of National 
Health and Welfare, cited by RCAP, ibid 378. See further RCAP ibid and Aboriginal 
Healing Foundation, above n 2. 
26 See the Statement of Reconciliation: Learning from the Past, 7 January 1998. 
27 On 20 November 2005 an ‘Agreement in Principle’ was entered into between the 
Canadian government, the Assembly of First Nations and various law firms 
representing clients through class actions. On 25 April 2006 the Minister of Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development, Mr Jim Prentice, announced that a final 
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organizations ‘operated Indian Residential Schools for the education of 
aboriginal children and certain harms and abuses were committed against those 
children’ and thus it was desirable for the government to provide ‘a fair, 
comprehensive and lasting resolution of the legacy of Indian Residential 
Schools.’ Canada has agreed to a $1.9b settlement agreement that compensates, 
not only victims of abuse, but also all who attended the residential schools.28 
 
This article is a comparative research and teaching resource that provides an 
overview of issues pertaining to the stolen generation in Canada and 
Australia.29 To this end this article is comprised of two parts. First, it provides a 
historical overview of the removal and detaining of aboriginal children in 
Canada and Australia. As a consequence of the revelations of this past practice, 
litigation has been undertaken by members of the stolen generations in both 
Canada and Australia. In turn, the second part includes a summary of the key 
cases in Canada and Australia. It will be seen that unlike in Australia, some 
Canadian aboriginal claimants have successfully brought actions for 
compensation against, inter alia, the federal Canadian government for the 
damages stemming from their experiences in the aboriginal residential 
schools.30 In the course of this discussion, the various causes of actions relied  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                    
agreement had been reached between all relevant parties. This was finalised in the 8 
May 2006 Agreement. Final approval was delayed to some extent by the change in 
the Canadian federal government. 
28 As noted above, an agreement was entered into between the Canadian government, 
the Assembly of First Nations and various law firms representing clients through class 
actions. These class actions included plaintiffs who were not physically or sexually 
abused whilst detained and thus were claiming damages for the substandard 
conditions in the schools, loss of language and culture and maternal deprivation. 
Under the terms of the agreement compensation will be paid to all persons who 
attended aboriginal residential schools, not only those who were physically or 
sexually abused. In turn, the agreement provides for the discontinuance of these class 
actions. It should be noted that the agreement does not remove the right to litigate and 
thus an individual may still bring a claim if they are unhappy with the extent of the 
compensation. 
29 The discussion is designed to introduce researchers and students to the legal issues 
arising out of the stolen generation litigation, rather than providing a comprehensive 
analysis of those legal issues.  
30 See for example Blackwater v Plint (No 1) (1998) 52 BCLR (3d) 18; Blackwater v 
Plint (No 2) (2001) 93 BCLR (3d) 228; Blackwater v Plint (No 3) (2003) 235 DLR 
(4th) 60; Blackwater v Plint (No 4) (2005) 258 DLR (4th) 275; M(FS) v Clarke [1999] 
11 WWR 301 (Mowatt); A(TWN) v Canada (2001) 92 BCLR (3d) 250. 
2006                                                            The Stolen Generations 139 
 
upon by the plaintiffs are examined.31 It will be seen from this discussion that 
while the plaintiffs in these leading Canadian cases were ultimately successful 
under at least one of their heads of claim, the approaches in these cases in 
regard to the Crown’s liability for breaching fiduciary duties,32 the duty of 
care,33 and non-delegable duties34 is inconsistent. Thus even in regard to the 
Canadian jurisprudence key legal issues pertaining to the Crown’s liability for 
the aboriginal residential school experience continues to be unresolved.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 For example, claims were brought for, inter alia, breaches of the duty of care, 
fiduciary duties and statutory duties. Again note that the discussion is designed to 
introduce researchers and students to the legal issues arising out of the stolen 
generation litigation, rather than providing a comprehensive analysis of those legal 
issues. Such comprehensive analysis has been undertaken elsewhere by the author in 
regards to the issue of breach of fiduciary duties (Julie Cassidy, ‘The Stolen 
Generation: A Breach of Fiduciary Duties? Canadian v Australian approaches to 
fiduciary duties’ (2003) 34:2 University of Ottawa Law Review 175) and the issues of 
breach of the duty of care, vicarious liability and non-delegable duties (Cassidy, 
above n 3).  
32 As discussed below, in Blackwater v Plint (No 2) (2001) 93 BCLR (3d) 228 the 
court relied on a particular line of authority to deny the claims based on a breach of 
fiduciary duties. In Mowatt [1999] 11 WWR 301, however, the court followed a 
contrary line of authority, supported by the Canadian Supreme Court, and upheld the 
plaintiff’s claims in equity against the Anglican Church. See further Cassidy, ibid. 
33 As discussed below, it will be seen that in Blackwater v Plint (No 2) ibid the court 
rejected claims of direct liability against Canada and the United Church of Canada for 
breach of the duty of care. The court held that the defendants neither knew, nor ought 
to have known, of the sexual assaults upon the students. See also Blackwater v Plint 
(No 4) (2005) 258 DLR (4th) 275. By contrast, in Mowatt ibid 353 the court found that 
Canada and the Anglican Church, as employers, were imputed with the school 
principal’s knowledge of the sexual assaults and breached the duty of care by failing 
to take reasonable supervisory precautions against sexual abuse by dormitory 
supervisors. Both Canada and the Church were held to have failed to protect the 
plaintiff from harm. See further Cassidy, above n 3. 
34 As discussed below, it will be seen that in Blackwater v Plint (No 2) ibid the court 
held that Canada had breached its non-delegable statutory duties owed to the children 
under the Indian Act. By contrast, in Blackwater v Plint (No 4) ibid [49]-[50] and 
[54]-[55] the court concluded that the non-mandatory nature of the language in the 
Indian Act meant there was no non-delegable statutory duty. 
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II HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF REMOVAL AND DETAINING OF 
ABORIGINAL CHILDREN 
 
A  Canada 
 
To briefly35 set these legal issues in their historical context, in Canada the 
aboriginal residential schools were first established in the 1600s,36 prior to 
Confederation, as part of the Christian churches’ missionary work.37  It was not 
until 1874 that the Canadian federal government began to play a role in the 
administration of the schools. As noted above, the schools were part of the 
government’s policy of assimilation38 and were advocated as the ‘final solution 
of the Indian problem’.39 The federal government’s involvement was also 
spurred by its obligation to provide education for Indian children under the 
Indian Act 1894 and in accordance with the terms of treaties with various First 
Nations.40 Under the Indian Act 1894 and successive legislation41 the 
government could require attendance by Indian children at aboriginal  
 
 
 
                                                 
35 For a fuller discussion of the history of aboriginal residential schools in Canada see 
RCAP, above n 2 and Cassidy, above n 2.  
36 Aboriginal Healing Foundation, above n 2, 3. The first aboriginal boarding schools 
were established in New France between 1620 and 1680 by the Recollets, Jesuits and 
Urslines religious orders: IRSR, above n 3.  See further IRSR, above n 3. 
37 IRSR ibid. 
38 RCAP above n 2, 335. See further RCAP, above n 2 and Aboriginal Healing 
Foundation, above n 2. This was also spurred by the government’s constitutional 
responsibility for Indians and their lands under the Constitution Act 1867: A(TWN) v 
Canada (2001) 92 BCLR (3d) 250, 253; Mowatt [1999] 11 WWR 301, 319. See also 
Blackwater v Plint (No 1) (1998) 52 BCLR (3d) 18, [91] regarding the constitutional 
authority under British North America Act 1869 s 91(24). 
39 Aboriginal Healing Foundation ibid 7, quoting the Deputy Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs, Duncan Campbell Scott. See further RCAP ibid and Aboriginal Healing 
Foundation ibid. 
40 RCAP ibid 335. See also IRSR, above n 3. For example, Treaty No 1 includes a 
pledge by the Crown ‘to maintain a school on each reserve hereby made, whenever 
the Indians of the reserve should desire it.’ Similar clauses are included in Treaties No 
2-11.  
41 See Blackwater v Plint (No 1) (1998) 52 BCLR (3d) 18, [32]; Mowatt [1999] 11 
WWR 301, 305. 
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residential schools.42 ‘Truant officers’ were in turn empowered to take any 
Indian child into custody so as to convey them to a school ‘using as much force 
as the circumstances require’.43 While some children were voluntarily placed in 
the schools by their parents, believing that the schools would provide their 
children with greater opportunities, others were forcibly taken without their 
parents’ consent or consent that had been obtained through duress, through 
threats of jail or fines by Department of Indian Affairs officials.44 Children 
were in turn taken to schools, not only days away from their families, but 
sometimes to other provinces/territories.45 By 1913 there were 107 aboriginal 
residential schools across Canada. Over time 130 schools existed.46 While the 
schools were located in every province and territory apart from New 
Foundland, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island,47 they were mainly 
located in Manitoba and west of this province.48  
 
Eventually, the federal government was involved in the conduct of nearly every 
aboriginal residential school. The courts have characterised the arrangement as 
a ‘joint venture’ or ‘partnership’ between the respective Churches and the 
government.49 Canada contracted with the Churches to administer the 
schools,50 while the government had the final say on the employment of the 
principal and had a supervisory role over the conduct of the schools.  
 
 
 
                                                 
42 IRSR, above n 3. By 1920 it was mandatory for all Indian children between the 
ages of 7 and 15 to attend school: Mowatt ibid 305; Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid 
[32]; IRSR, above n 3. Similarly, under Indian Act 1951 ss 115, 116 and 118 it was, 
inter alia, mandatory for Indian children between the ages of 6 and 16 to attend an 
Indian school: Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [34]. 
43 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid.  
44 Mowatt [1999] 11 WWR 301, 305; Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid; IRSR, above n 
3. See, for example the evidence regarding the removal of EAJ and ERM in A(TWN) v 
Canada (2001) 92 BCLR (3d) 250, 259 and 276. 
45 See RCAP, above n 2, 351.  
46 IRSR, above n 3. 
47 Cartography prepared by Public History Inc for the Indian Residential Schools 
Resolution Department. 
48 This flows from the correlation between the location of Indian reserves and the 
location of the schools. 
49 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) (1998) 52 BCLR (3d) 18, [151]; Blackwater v Plint (No 
2) (2001) 93 BCLR (3d) 228, 246; Blackwater v Plint (No 4) (2005) 258 DLR (4th) 
275, [38]. 
50 A(TWN) v Canada (2001) 92 BCLR (3d) 250, 253. 
DEAKIN LAW REVIEW                                                        VOLUME 11 NO 1 142 
 
In the 1950s there was a shift in government policy from assimilation to 
integration of aboriginal peoples into the broader Canadian society.51 This 
change in policy included a plan to close the aboriginal residential schools and 
‘transferring Indian children to provincial schools’.52 Students from small 
and/or remote communities, however, continued to attend aboriginal residential 
schools.53 The schools also continued to operate as part of the government’s 
social welfare system54 in the sense that aboriginal children were often 
considered by ‘white’ child welfare personnel to be neglected by their 
aboriginal families.55  
 
In 1969 the federal government assumed total responsibility for the aboriginal 
residential schools.56 At this point the federal government ended the joint 
venture with the Churches and became the employer of those working at the 
schools.57 In many cases, however, the Churches continued to be involved in 
the schools through contractual arrangements with the government.58  In these 
cases, control of the schools continued to be joint, even after the changes of 
1969.59 By the late 1970s most residential schools ceased to operate. By 1979 
only 12 aboriginal residential schools continued to exist, with a total resident 
population of 1899 students.60 In 1996 the last federally funded school, located 
in Saskatchewan, was closed.61 
 
The RCAP found that the conditions in the Canadian aboriginal residential 
schools where children were placed were substandard.62 The dormitories in  
 
 
                                                 
51 Mowatt [1999] 11 WWR 301, 321. See RCAP, above n 2, 346; IRSR, above n 3. 
52 RCAP ibid 346 and 349. 
53 RCAP ibid 348; IRSR, above n 3. 
54 RCAP ibid 349; IRSR ibid. 
55 A government report suggested that at one point 75% of aboriginal children 
attending the aboriginal residential schools were ‘neglected’ children: Relationships 
Between Church and State in Indian Education, 26 September 1966, quoted in RCAP 
ibid. These children were adjudged neglected according to non-aboriginal, 
Eurocentric notions of childcare: RCAP ibid. 
56 RCAP ibid 350.  
57 RCAP ibid.  
58 Mowatt [1999] 11 WWR 301, 343-346; IRSR, above n 3. 
59 Mowatt ibid 343-346.  
60 RCAP, above n 2, 351.  
61 IRSR, above n 3. 
62 RCAP, above n 2, 353 and 362.  
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which the children slept were overcrowded and lacked heating.63 There were 
insufficient resources to clothe and feed the children.64 The standard of 
education provided in the institutions was also substandard.65 As a consequence 
of the remoteness of the schools and the pay offered to employees, the schools 
attracted poorly skilled teachers.66 At times the teachers were not even 
qualified to teach.67  The school curriculum was designed to provide only a 
basic education, in preparation for the students to undertake work as domestic 
or menial labourers.68 Children were subjected to excessive physical 
punishment69 and in many cases sexual abuse.70  The children were not allowed 
to speak their aboriginal languages and were punished if they did. 71 
 
The federal government estimates that up to 100 schools could be involved in 
current litigation.72 It has also been estimated that 90,600 former aboriginal 
students are still alive today.73 
 
B  Australia 
 
As in Canada, the establishment of aboriginal schools in Australia pre-dated 
federation. The HREOC found that forcible removals of aboriginal children 
began in the very first days of European occupation.74 However, as European  
 
                                                 
63 RCAP ibid. 
64 RCAP ibid 358, 359 and 364.  
65 RCAP ibid 345 and 353.  
66 RCAP ibid 345. 
67 RCAP ibid. 
68 RCAP ibid 345 and 353. 
69 RCAP ibid 365-366 and 369-370.   
70 For examples of such abuse see Blackwater v Plint (No 1) (1998) 52 BCLR (3d) 
18; Blackwater v Plint (No 2) (2001) 93 BCLR (3d) 228; Mowatt [1999] 11 WWR 
301; A(TWN) v Canada (2001) 92 BCLR (3d) 250. As noted above, it has been 
suggested that in some schools all children were sexually abused: ‘Reports of sexual 
abuse may be low, expert says’ The Globe Mail, 1 June 1990, A3 reporting the 
comments of Rix Rogers, special adviser to the Minister of National Health and 
Welfare, cited by RCAP ibid 378. 
71 RCAP ibid 341-342. See also A(TWN) v Canada ibid 260. See further RCAP ibid 
and Aboriginal Healing Foundation, above n 2. 
72 IRSR, above n 3. 
73 Ibid.  
74 HREOC, above n 1, 4. 
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settlement did not occupy Australia until much later than Canada, it was not 
until the beginning of the 1800s that the first aboriginal school was created in 
Australia. In 1814 Governor Macquarie opened a school for aboriginal children 
in Parramatta, New South Wales.75 Even at this early stage in the history of the 
stolen generation in Australia, the local aboriginal people, the Darug people, 
came to realise that the idea behind the school was to separate the children 
from their families.76 They in turn removed their children from the school and 
the school closed in 1820.77 Governor Hutt of Western Australia similarly 
supported the establishment of an aboriginal school in 1840 by a missionary, 
Reverend John Smithies, for the ‘christianising and civilising’ of aboriginal 
children.78 Missionaries established similar schools throughout the 1800s with 
some financial support from relevant governments.79 
 
In the lead up to federation the States enacted legislation authorising the 
removal of aboriginal children from their families. For example, under the 
Aboriginal Protection Act 1869 (Vic) the Board for the Protection of 
Aborigines was established and under the regulations80 the Governor could 
order the removal of any aboriginal child from their family and their placement 
in reformatory or industrial schools if they were deemed neglected or 
unprotected. In South Australia Aboriginal Orphan Ordinance 1844 (SA) s 2 
empowered the Protector of Aborigines to apply to two justices to order the 
indenture of any ‘half-caste’ or other aboriginal child.81 In time legislative 
removal powers were not premised on neglect, much less required a court 
order.82 For example, the neglect requirement in the Aboriginal Protection Act 
1869 (Vic) was removed by the Aborigines Regulation 1899 (Vic).  Broader 
removal powers were also conferred under the Aboriginal Protection and  
 
                                                 
75 Ibid 9. 
76 HREOC ibid. 
77 HREOC ibid. 
78 Paul Hasluck, Black Australian: A Survey of Native Policy in Western Australia 
1829-1897 (2nd ed, 1970), 89. 
79 Buti, above n 8, 58. 
80Aborigines Protection Regulations 1871 (Vic). See further 
www.foundingdocs.gov.au/places/ vic/vic7i.htm.  
81 Heather McRae, Garth Nettheim and Laura Beacroft Indigenous Legal Issues (2nd 
ed, 1997), 411. 
82 See also Aborigines Act 1905 (WA); Aborigines Protection Regulation 1909 (WA); 
Northern Territory Aboriginal Act 1910 (SA); Aborigines Act 1911 (SA). Under the 
Aborigines Act 1934 (SA) aboriginal children were effectively deemed neglected 
within the terms of the Maintenance Act. 
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Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 (Qld). Under Aboriginal Protection 
and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897 (Qld) s 31 the Minister was 
authorised to remove aboriginal children from their families and detain them in 
institutions. Under the legislation, whether the child’s parents were living or 
not, legal guardianship of all aboriginal children was placed with the Chief 
Protector of Aborigines.83  Even in States such as New South Wales that did 
not have a legislative regime for the removal of aboriginal children prior to 
federation, this policy was conducted without legal powers by threatening the 
child’s parents and promises of material benefits such as rations.84  
 
Unlike in Canada, federation did not at first see the federal government assume 
responsibility for aboriginal peoples. The Constitution Act 1901 (UK) initially 
excepted ‘the aboriginal race’ from the federal Parliament’s legislative 
authority over ‘race’. The States continued to retain their legislative 
competence over aboriginal peoples. Thus post federation, such legislation 
continued to be passed by the States,85 rather than the federal legislature.  
 
                                                 
83 Under Aboriginals Preservation and Protection Act 1939 (Qld) this role was taken 
over by the Director of Native Affairs. 
84 Read, above n 10, 2. Legislation was not passed in new South Wales until 1909: 
Aborigines Protection Act 1909 (NSW). 
85 For example, in 1915 the Aborigines Protection Act 1909 (NSW) was amended to 
authorise under s 13A the New South Wales Aborigines Protection Board to remove 
aboriginal children without the consent of their parents if the Board considered such 
to be in the children’s best interests. The amendment also removed the precondition 
of neglect. No court order was required. ‘For being Aboriginal’ was sufficient to 
authorise the removal: Read, ibid. See also HREOC, Bringing them home (Education 
Module) (2002), ‘Track the History’;  HREOC, above n 1, 10. See 
www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/IndigLRes/rciadic/regional/nsw-vic-tas/206.html. See 
further in regard to the history of child welfare in New South Wales: 
www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/RR7CHP2. By 1911 essentially all States and 
the Northern Territory had legislation in place for the forcible removal of aboriginal 
children from their families: Healey, above n 7, 11. It has been suggested that the 
exception was Tasmania as this State denied that it had any aboriginal persons living 
in the State: Healey, above n 7, 11. However, even in Tasmania the Cape Barren 
Island Reserve Act 1912 (Tas) had some impact in this regard as it authorised the 
removal of aboriginal persons from the mainland to Cape Barren Island and, more 
specifically, provided for the creation of a ‘half-caste’ reserve and authorised the 
Secretary for Lands to determine who could reside in the reserve. Cf McRae, above n 
81, 412. After 1935 aboriginal children continued to be removed from Cape Barren 
Island and surrounding islands, but pursuant to the Infants Welfare Act 1935 (Tas) and 
subsequent welfare legislation: HREOC, above n 1, 626. 
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Under the Constitution, however, the federal Parliament had authority over the 
territories86 and thus also played a role, even at this early stage, in the 
legislative removal of aboriginal children in the territories. Thus in 191187 the 
federal parliament enacted the Aboriginals Ordinance 1911 (Cth) that 
authorised under s 3 of the Act the Chief Protector to remove any ‘aboriginal or 
half-caste’ child if it was in the Chief Protector’s opinion in the best interests of 
the child. Thus given the high concentration of the aboriginal population in the 
Northern Territory,88 the Commonwealth’s role in the removal of aboriginal 
children was significant even at this stage. 
In Cubillo 289 the court found that documents dating from 191190 indicated 
support at the federal level for the removal of part-aboriginal children from 
their families and placing such children in institutions. While the primary 
institutions where children were detained in the Northern Territory were in 
Darwin and Alice Springs, sometimes part-aboriginal boys were placed in an 
institution in Adelaide, South Australia. 91  Thus, as in Canada, the children 
could be placed in institutions many miles from their families and possibly 
interstate. 92   
 
                                                 
86 See Constitution Act 1901 (UK) s 122. Note in regard to the Australian Capital 
Territory that under the Aborigines Welfare Act 1954 (Cth) aboriginal persons 
residing in this territory were subject to any relevant New South Wales legislation. 
87 This date is significant because the Northern Territory was originally annexed to 
South Australia and it was not until 1911 that the Commonwealth became responsible 
for the Northern Territory. This historical fact explains why the discussion below 
refers to both the Northern Territory Aboriginal Act 1910 (SA) and Aboriginals 
Ordinance 1911 (Cth) in regard to the aboriginal peoples of the Northern Territory. 
88 In a sense the existence of removal powers in Western Australia, Queensland and 
the Northern Territory were, therefore, most significant from a purely numerical 
perspective as a consequence of their significant aboriginal populations. 
89 See Cubillo 2 [2000] FCA 1084, [170] and [200] and [220]. 
90 Cubillo 2 ibid [171]. This policy of removal is evidenced in a report dated 12 
September 1911 from the Acting Administrator of the Northern Territory to the 
Minister for External Affairs in which it was recommended that despite the undoubted 
protests from their mothers, ‘all half-caste children who are living with aborigines’ 
should be gathered in: Cubillo 2 ibid [171]. Similarly a year later the Chief Protector 
of Aboriginals reported that ‘No half-caste children should be allowed to remain in 
any native camp, but they all should be withdrawn and placed on stations.  So far as 
practicable, this plan is now being adopted’: Cubillo 2 ibid [172]. 
91 See Cubillo 2 ibid [170], [200], [220]-[256]. 
92 Cf Healey, above n 7, 17-18. 
2006                                                            The Stolen Generations 147 
 
Patrol officers, sometimes accompanied by other persons, such as missionaries, 
effected the removals. It seems that parental consent to the removal of part-
aboriginal children was not even raised as an issue until the 1940s.93 In 
essence, after a number of incidents where aboriginal children were forcibly 
removed from their families during the 1940s, the policy of forced removals 
began to be criticised by the public.94 While it seems that in the 1950s efforts 
were made in given cases to obtain parental consent to the removal of 
aboriginal children, it also appears that the parents were not provided with a 
choice and forced removals continued to be authorised. 95 
The legislation authorising the removal of part-aboriginal children purely on 
the basis of their aboriginality or, more particularly, mixed heritage was in time 
repealed. For example, in Victoria the Aborigines Act 1957 (Vic) deleted the 
specific power to remove aboriginal children from their families. Thus from 
this date aboriginal children fell under the general auspices of the Child 
Welfare Act 1954 (Vic).96 In the Northern Territory the Aboriginal Ordinance 
1918 was repealed in 1957, and the Welfare Ordinance 1957 (Cth) did not 
replicate the power to remove part-aboriginal children without a ‘welfare’ 
reason.97 From this date, technically, removals could only occur without 
parental consent if the child was declared a ward or committed by a court to the 
State’s care.98 It was not until 1964, with the enactment of the Social Welfare 
Ordinance 1964 (NT), that aboriginal children were covered by the general 
welfare provision of that statute, rather than provisions specifically confined to  
 
                                                 
93 Cubillo 2 [2000] FCA 1084, [201]. See also the discussion of the New South Wales 
Aborigines Protection Board and the first Conference of Commonwealth and State 
Aboriginal Authorities, held in Canberra on 21 to 23 April 1937 in Healey ibid 23 and 
28 in regard to the need to remove aboriginal children with or without their parents’ 
consent. 
94 See the discussion in Cubillo 2 ibid [201]-[214].  
95 See the discussion in, inter alia, Cubillo 2 ibid [218], [220] and [221].  
96 See also Aboriginal Act 1962 (SA) whereby the removal of aboriginal children was 
effectively shifted to the auspices of the Maintenance Act 1926 (SA). It has been 
stated that that removal on the basis of aboriginality probably continued to be 
authorised in South Australia until the enactment of the Community Welfare Act 1972 
(SA): McRae, above n 81, 411. Similarly, in New South Wales it was not until the 
repeal of the Aborigines Protection Act 1909 (NSW) by the Aborigines Act 1969 
(NSW) that aboriginal children were subject to general child welfare laws and could 
not be removed on the basis of aboriginality: McRae, above n 81, 411. 
97 Cubillo 2 [2000] FCA 1084, [259]; HREOC, above n 1, 11. 
98 Cubillo 2 ibid. 
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aboriginal children.99 Similarly, in Queensland it was not until the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Act 1965 (Qld) repealed the Aboriginals 
Preservation and Protection Act 1939 (Qld) that aboriginal children fell under 
the general welfare provisions. It was not until 1971,100 however, that the 
statutory power of the Director of Native Affairs to remove aboriginal children 
from aboriginal reserves was repealed. 
 
Despite the repealing of the legislative bases for the removal of aboriginal 
children, the policy continued, but removals were technically not on the basis 
of aboriginality but alleged welfare concerns.101 Thus, while such removals 
continue even today, from the early 1970s removals were no longer based 
purely on race as government policy had shifted towards greater aboriginal 
participation in aboriginal affairs.102 Nevertheless, a number of the missionsand 
aboriginal institutions continued to operate throughout the 1970s and 1980s.103 
 
The HREOC report, Bringing Them Home, concluded that between one in three 
and one in ten aboriginal children were forcibly removed from their families 
and communities between 1910 and 1970.104 In turn it has been estimated that 
in the course of the 1900s, 40,000 aboriginal children were removed from their 
families.105 The conditions in the missions and institutions where the children 
were placed were poor.106 There were often insufficient resources to properly 
shelter, clothe and feed the children.107 The standard of education provided in 
the institutions was very basic, being designed essentially to provide a basis for  
 
                                                 
99 McRae, above n 81, 411. Similarly, in New South Wales it was not until the repeal 
of the Aborigines Protection Act 1909 (NSW) by the Aborigines Act 1969 (NSW) that 
aboriginal children were subject to general child welfare laws and could not be 
removed on the basis of aboriginality: McRae, above n 81, 411.  
100 Repealed by the Aborigines Act 1971 (Qld) and Torres Strait Islanders Act 1971 
(Qld). 
101 Healey, above n 7, 16, 18 and 29. 
102 Buti, above n 8, 3. 
103 Buti ibid 136, citing Haebich, Submission to the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Inquiry into the Removal of Aboriginal Children from their Families 
(2000), 229-300. 
104 HREOC, above n 1, 4. It has been stated that between 1919 and 1929 one third of 
all aboriginal children were removed from their families and between 1950 and 1965 
one in five children were separated from their families: Healey, above n 7, 12. 
105 Healey ibid 12. 
106 HREOC, above n 1, 15. 
107 HREOC ibid. See also Healey, above n 7, 19. 
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the children to ultimately work as menial labourers such as farm hands and 
domestic servants.108 Children were subjected to excessive physical 
punishment109 and in many cases sexual abuse.110 The children were not 
allowed to speak their aboriginal languages and were punished if they did. 111 
 
III SUMMARY OF KEY CASES  
 
A Canada112 
 
Mowatt and A(TWN) v Clarke113   
The plaintiffs in Mowatt114 and A(TWN) v Clarke115 were of Canadian Indian 
descent. As Status Indians under the Indian Act attendance and residency at an 
aboriginal residential school was again mandatory.116  
In 1901 St George’s Anglican school (‘St George’s’) for aboriginal children 
was founded by the New England Company (‘NEC’), a missionary society of 
the Church of England.117 By 1921 the NEC was having financial difficulty 
operating the school and entered into an agreement with the Canadian 
government in 1922 for the lease of the school buildings and lands.118 From 
this date the Canadian government provided most of the funding for the 
school,119 although NEC continued to provide some funding.120  In 1927 
Canada purchased the lands from the NEC at less than valuation in exchange 
for a government promise that it would continue to run the school and train the  
 
                                                 
108 HREOC ibid 16. See also Healey ibid. 
109 HREOC ibid 15 and 16. 
110 HREOC ibid 17. See also Healey, above n 7, 12 and 19. 
111 Healey ibid 18. 
112 For a more detailed account of the factual basis of the claims in Blackwater v Plint 
(No 1), (No 2), (No 3) and (No 4) see Cassidy, above n 2.  
113 Again, for a fuller discussion of the factual basis of these cases see Cassidy, ibid. 
114  [1999] 11 WWR 301. 
115 (2001) 92 BCLR (3d) 250. 
116 Mowatt [1999] 11 WWR 301, 305. 
117 Mowatt ibid 313. 
118 Mowatt ibid 314. 
119 Mowatt ibid 320. 
120 Mowatt ibid 316 and 320. 
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students in the Anglican Church.121 Under the 1927 agreement it was 
understood that both parties would remain associated in the management of St 
George’s.122 The Church would undertake the day to day running of the 
school,123 while the government would undertake a supervisory role. The 
government was also responsible for the physical premises at the school.124  
 
Again, the Department of Indian Affairs, not the Church, determined which 
children were sent to the school. St George’s was closed in 1979.125 
 
The court in Mowatt126 found that St George’s was a ‘religious institution run 
with military precision’. Dormitory supervisors had control over every waking 
moment of the children’s existence, apart from their schooling.127 The plaintiff 
in Mowatt128 entered St George’s in September 1969 when he was eight. From 
the age of nine, and over a two-year period, his dormitory supervisor, Clarke, 
sexually assaulted the plaintiff and other boys.129 The principal of St George’s, 
Harding, and the principal of the elementary school were both told of the 
sexual assaults.130  
 
Harding in turn told the chaplain and local pastor, Reverend Dixon, and there 
was evidence that both of the principals told the Bishop of the day.131 However, 
the matter was simply covered up.132 It appears that Harding sought to cover up 
Clarke’s assaults as he was also sexually assaulting the boys.133 He 
consequently did not want there to be any investigation at the school as this  
 
 
                                                 
121 Mowatt ibid 315. 
122 Mowatt ibid. 
123 Mowatt ibid 321. 
124 Mowatt ibid 320 and 321. 
125 Mowatt ibid 321. 
126 Mowatt ibid 305. 
127 Mowatt ibid 306. 
128 Mowatt ibid. 
129 Mowatt ibid 307. 
130 Mowatt ibid 308. See also A(TWN) v Canada (2001) 92 BCLR (3d) 250, 256 and 
280. 
131 Mowatt ibid 310. 
132 Mowatt ibid 346. There was no investigation: Mowatt ibid 310. Clarke was told to 
resign and the principal of St George’s gave him a latter of recommendation: Mowatt 
ibid 309-310. No counselling was offered to the abused children: Mowatt ibid 346. 
133 Mowatt ibid 310-312. See also A(TWN) v Canada (2001) 92 BCLR (3d) 250, 253. 
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might reveal his own sexual assaults.134 The diocesan personnel’s motive for 
the cover up seemed to have been their concern that the subject school not 
attract attention because at the time other aboriginal residential schools were 
being closed.135 Thus the Department of Indian Affairs was never informed 
about Clarke’s misconduct.136  
 
The plaintiff in Mowatt137 was successful in his claims. Canada and the 
Anglican Church of Canada were held to be vicariously liable for the sexual 
assaults upon, inter alia, the plaintiff. Canada and the Church were also held 
liable for breaches of their duty of care. The court found that the school 
principal’s knowledge of the sexual assaults was imputed to Canada and the 
Anglican Church, as employers, and that they breached the duty of care by 
failing to take reasonable supervisory precautions against sexual abuse by 
dormitory supervisors.138 Both Canada and the Church were held to have failed 
to protect the plaintiff from harm.139 The court apportioned liability 60% to the 
Church and 40% to Canada.  
 
The court also followed a line of authority, contrary to that in Blackwater v 
Plint (No 2),140 discussed below, and supported by the Canadian Supreme 
Court, and upheld the plaintiff’s claims in equity. The court rejected the 
suggestion in Blackwater v Plint (No 2)141 that to find a breach of fiduciary 
duty the defendant must act dishonestly and take ‘advantage of a relationship 
of trust or confidence for his or her direct or indirect personal advantage’.142 
Thus the absence of mala fides on the part of the Anglican Church did not 
serve to release it from liability.143 Again, contrary to Blackwater v Plint (No 
2),144 the breach was held to be actionable in equity even though the plaintiff’s  
 
 
 
                                                 
134 Mowatt ibid 312 and 346. 
135 Mowatt ibid 312-313 and 346. 
136 Mowatt ibid 310 and 346. 
137 Mowatt ibid. 
138 Mowatt ibid 353. 
139 Mowatt ibid. 
140 (2001) 93 BCLR (3d) 228. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Mowatt [1999] 11 WWR 301, 354-358. 
143 Mowatt ibid. For a fuller discussion of the court’s findings in regard to breach of 
fiduciary duties see Cassidy, above n 2. 
144 (2001) 93 BCLR (3d) 228. 
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claims were in both tort and equity. The court noted that the proposition in 
Blackwater v Plint (No 2)145 was contrary to the Supreme Court of Canada 
decision in M(K) v M(H)146 and chose to follow the latter case.147 
As Canada had assumed guardianship over those aboriginal children who had 
been removed from their families, including the plaintiff, this clearly gave rise 
to a fiduciary relationship.148 The court held that Canada’s failure to supervise 
was negligent, but not a breach of its fiduciary duty.149 The Church was also 
held to stand in a fiduciary relationship to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was 
vulnerable and the Church was in a position of power over him within this 
test.150 He was a child isolated from his family in an Anglican institution where 
‘control was almost absolute on a daily basis’.151 This relationship of trust was 
breached when the Church did nothing to investigate the matter and care for the 
plaintiff.152 The court consequently upheld the plaintiff’s claims against the 
Anglican Church of Canada for breach of fiduciary duty, in addition to his 
claims in tort.153 
A(TWN) v Canada154 was determined on the basis of an admission of liability 
by both Canada and the Anglican Church on the basis of the findings in 
Mowatt.155 The plaintiffs were all students at the same aboriginal residential 
school considered in Mowatt.156 Clarke had sexually abused each plaintiff. 
Harding also sexually assaulted two of the plaintiffs.157 Again, evidence was 
given that both Harding and the principal of the elementary school were told of 
the sexual assaults.158 No counselling was offered to the abused children.159 
Each of the plaintiffs later developed severe psychological conditions as a  
 
                                                 
145 Ibid. 
146 (1992) 96 DLR (4th) 289. 
147 Mowatt [1999] 11 WWR 301, 355-356.  
148 Mowatt ibid 347, 349 and 356.  
149 Mowatt ibid 356.  
150Mowatt ibid, 357. 
151Mowatt ibid. See also Mowatt ibid 349 and 350. 
152Mowatt ibid 358. 
153 Mowatt ibid 357.  
154 (2001) 92 BCLR (3d) 250, 255. 
155 [1999] 11 WWR 301. 
156 Ibid. 
157 A(TWN) v Canada (2001) 92 BCLR (3d) 250, 253. 
158 A(TWN) v Canada ibid 256 and 280. 
159 A(TWN) v Canada ibid 280. 
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consequence of the assaults, including sexual disorders, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, suicidal tendencies and extreme depression. Canada and the Church 
admitted vicarious liability and breach of the duty of care. The defendants 
agreed to an apportionment of responsibility on the same basis as in Mowatt.160 
Aggravated and punitive damages were also ordered against the defendants. 
Blackwater v Plint (No 1), (No 2), (No 3) and (No 4) 
The plaintiffs in Blackwater v Plint were all Canadian Indians within the terms 
of the Indian Act 1927.161 Attendance at an aboriginal residential school was 
mandatory under this legislation, its predecessors and subsequent versions of  
the Act.162 All the plaintiffs attended Alberni Indian Residential School 
(‘AIRS’) during various years between 1943 and 1970.163  
 
The Presbyterian Church had founded AIRS in 1891.164 This Church, and from 
1925,165 the United Church, administered the school.166 AIRS operated with 
periodic government funding.167 The arrangement between Canada and the 
Church, which the courts have described in terms of a joint venture,168 was 
formalised in 1911169 through a written agreement and a further written 
agreement  in 1962.170 Under the 1911 agreement the Church agreed to manage 
the school, including employing qualified teachers and officers, in particular, 
the principal.171  
                                                 
160 [1999] 11 WWR 301. 
161 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) (1998) 52 BCLR (3d) 18, [1].    
162 The court in Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [32] noted that under Indian Act 1927 
s 10 it was mandatory for Indian children between the ages of 7 and 15 to attend an 
Indian school. Similarly, under Indian Act 1951 ss 115,116 and 118 it was, inter alia, 
mandatory for Indian children between the ages of 6 and 16 to attend an Indian 
school: Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [34]. 
163 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [1]. 
164 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [2] and [36]. 
165 In 1925 the Presbyterian Church combined with two other religions to form the 
United Church. 
166 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) (1998) 52 BCLR (3d) 18, [2]. 
167 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [2] and [36]. 
168 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [151]. 
169 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [2] and [3]. 
170 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [50].  
171 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [36], [42] and [54]. Note, the 1911 agreement had a 
five year expiry term, but it was felt unnecessary to renew the agreement as the 
parties had an understanding that the course of conduct would continue until the 1962 
Agreement, discussed below: Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [43]-[46]. 
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Again, under the 1962 agreement the Church was designated the responsibility 
of managing AIRS172 in accordance with government rules and regulations.173  
 
The appointment of teaching staff was, however, now the responsibility of the 
relevant Minister, but in consultation with the Church.174 Thus AIRS was 
managed by the Church, but under the supervision of the government.175 In 
regard to the latter, evidence was provided as to government inspections of 
AIRS.176 The removal of aboriginal children from their families and placement 
at AIRS was effected by Canada, not the Church, through its Department of 
Indian Affairs.177 Upon placement in AIRS the principal became the child’s 
legal guardian.178   
 
In 1965 classroom instruction at AIRS, the children being from then on bussed 
to local schools.179 On 1 April 1969 Canada took over complete operation of 
AIRS and operated it until it closed in 1973.180 
 
Plint was employed as a dormitory supervisor at AIRS from 1948 to 1953 and 
from 1963 to 1968.181 Dormitory supervisors were responsible for the ‘daily 
care and well being of the resident children’.182 Plint reported to, and worked  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
172 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) (1998) 52 BCLR (3d) 18, [52]-[53].  
173 These included the 1953 Indian Residential school Regulations, detailed above, 
and an Indian Affairs Branch Field Manual, produced in 1960: Blackwater v Plint (No 
1) ibid [79]-[86] and [88]. 
174 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [53] and [89].  
175 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [72]-[76], [83] and [86]. In this regard evidence 
was provided as to government inspections of AIRS: Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid 
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176 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [76].  
177 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [63].  
178 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [56] and [74].  
179 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [40]. 
180 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [3]. 
181 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [4]. 
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under the direction of, the school principal of AIRS.183 The principal had the 
power to employ and in turn terminate the employment of dormitory 
supervisors.184   
 
In 1995 and 1997 Plint was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault 
involving many of the plaintiffs in Blackwater v Plint (No 1).185 In regard to 
such plaintiffs, Canada and the Church admitted the sexual assaults in the 
subsequent civil litigation.186 A number of the plaintiffs, however, gave 
evidence, which was accepted by the court, as to assaults for which Plint had 
not been criminally tried.187 Many of the plaintiffs gave evidence that they told, 
inter alia, the principal that they were being abused by Plint, but were only 
punished for so doing.188 
 
In Blackwater v Plint (No 1)189 the plaintiffs’ sought damages for sexual 
assaults committed against them by Plint while they were resident at AIRS. In 
Blackwater v Plint (No 1)190 the court’s findings against Canada and the United 
Church of Canada were confined to the issue of vicarious liability. The 
plaintiffs contended that both the United Church of Canada and Canada were 
vicariously liable for, inter alia, Plint’s assaults.191 Canada asserted that the 
Church was solely vicariously liable as it was the Church that operated and 
managed AIRS,192 while the Church in turn said that Canada was Plint’s 
employer and the Church was a mere agent of the Government.193  
 
 
 
                                                 
183 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [4] and [28]. During the period from when Plint 
was first hired as a dormitory supervisor to his dismissal in 1968, the principals were 
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Plint (No 1) ibid [5]. 
184 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [28]. 
185 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [11]. 
186 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid. See Blackwater v Plint (No 2) (2001) 93 BCLR 
(3d) 228, 237. 
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188 Blackwater v Plint (No 2) (2001) 93 BCLR (3d) 228, 252-253. 
189 (1998) 52 BCLR (3d) 18. 
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After considering the relevant statutes and agreements between the Church and 
Canada and the historical development of the aboriginal residential schools, the 
court concluded that both the Church and the Government were Plint’s 
employer.  
 
The court found there was ‘sufficient joint control and a co-operative 
advancement of the respective interests’ of the Church and Canada that the 
conduct of AIRS was a joint venture.194  Both Canada and the Church were 
directly involved with, and executed effective and joint control over activities 
at AIRS, including dormitory supervisors such as Plint, through the office of 
the principal and through an informal partnership that benefited both the 
Church and Canada.195  The principal of the school was in turn held to be a 
representative of both the Government and the Church.196  
 
In determining that both were vicariously liable for the sexual assaults 
committed by Plint,197 the court applied two tests, the ‘conferral of authority 
test’ and the ‘closeness of connection test.’198 The court held that the authority 
of a parent199 over the children had been conferred on Plint and this conferral of 
power was sufficiently connected to the wrong. As to the closeness of 
connection test, as virtually all of Plint’s assaults occurred in his office or 
adjoining bedroom there was a close connection, both temporally and spatially, 
with his duties as a dormitory supervisor and the acts of wrongdoing.200 Thus 
both tests were satisfied on the facts and the defendants were held to be 
vicariously liable for Plint’s acts.201  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
194 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [151].  
195 Blackwater v Plint (No 1) ibid [103], [119], [121], [125], [137] and [151].  
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In Blackwater v Plint (No 2)202 the issues of, inter alia, the direct liability of the 
Church and Canada for negligence, breaches of fiduciary duties and non-
delegable statutory duties were determined.203 While the court in Blackwater v 
Plint (No 2)204 believed a duty of care was owed to the then children, the court 
rejected claims of direct liability against Canada and the United Church of 
Canada for breaches of that duty of care. The court asserted that the standard of 
conduct required of the Church and Canada had to be determined in accordance 
with the standards prevailing at the time of the offences.205 This was seen as 
particularly relevant when considering the issue of foreseeability of paedophilic 
behaviour.206 In turn, this assisted the court in concluding that the Church and 
Canada had neither actual,207 nor constructive, knowledge of the sexual assaults. 
In regard to the former point the court held that neither the principal, nor any 
other employee of the School, had been told of the assaults prior to Plint being 
fired.208  
 
The plaintiffs also alleged that Canada had breached its fiduciary duty by 
removing the plaintiffs from their families and placing them at AIRS.209 A 
breach of fiduciary duty was also claimed against both Canada and the Church 
in regard to the operation of AIRS where the plaintiffs alleged they were 
‘systematically subjected to abuse, mistreatment and racist ridicule and 
harassment’.210 The court found that through the joint venture the ‘Defendants 
could unilaterally affect the plaintiffs’ interests and the plaintiffs were peculiarly 
vulnerable’211 within the definition of a fiduciary relationship. However, the 
court ultimately concluded there was no breach of fiduciary duties.212 The court  
 
 
                                                 
202 (2001) 93 BCLR (3d) 228. 
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relied on a line of authority213 that provided that a breach of fiduciary duties 
would only arise where there was dishonesty or a conflict of interest.214 The 
court held there was no evidence of the requisite ‘dishonest intentional 
disloyalty’ on the part of Canada or the Church.215 It was also asserted that a 
fiduciary duty could not arise from a factual relationship that was also tortious 
or contractual in nature.216  This effectively prevented any claim being made for 
breach of fiduciary duties in light of the finding that Canada and the Church 
owed the plaintiffs a duty of care. 
 
While the claims of breach of duty of care and fiduciary duty did not succeed, 
the court held that Canada’s duty under the Indian Act 1951 with respect to the 
aboriginal residential schools was a non-delegable statutory duty.217  Under the 
Indian Act 1951 Canada intended to have ‘control over virtually every aspect of 
the lives of Indians … including schooling, and the pervasive nature of such 
control was not consistent with a delegable statutory duty’.218 In turn, a ‘very 
high standard of care [had been] imposed on Canada under the provisions of the 
Indian Act’.219 Moreover, as Canada was the plaintiffs’ guardian, it owed a ‘duty 
of special diligence’ which had not been discharged.220 Responsibility was 
allocated 75% to Canada and 25% to the Church.  
 
While Blackwater v Plint (No 3)221 involved appeals by the plaintiffs, the 
Church and Canada, as discussed below the key issue considered by the Court 
of Appeal was whether the Church should have been found vicariously liability 
in Blackwater v Plint (No 1).222 The court was quite dismissive of the plaintiffs’ 
appeals223 against the finding of no breach of the duty of care, asserting that it  
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2006                                                            The Stolen Generations 159 
 
amounted to an attempted retrial.224 Equally, in regard to the claim of breach of 
fiduciary duties, the court simply applied the same case225 that had been used in 
Blackwater v Plint (No 2)226 to reject the plaintiffs’ claim, refusing to take the 
opportunity to overrule that decision.227  The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ 
claims of loss of language and culture. The court found that this had not been 
properly pleaded before trial as an independent cause of action.228 Moreover, it 
was not possible to link this claim to the only cause of action that was not barred 
by the statute of limitation, namely the sexual assaults. 229  
 
As the court ultimately concluded that Canada had correctly been found to be 
vicariously liable for the assaults by Plint, it considered that the issues raised by 
Canada’s cross appeal were ‘moot’.230 It consequently made no substantive 
comment on the correctness of the finding against Canada for breach of non-
delegable duties. 231 
 
For essentially three reasons the court allowed the Church’s appeal against the 
finding of vicarious liability. First, the court concluded that the trial judge had 
erred in finding the Church to be Plint’s employer. Effectively the court asserted 
that the aboriginal residential schools were conducted by Canada and thus 
Canada, not the Church, should be viewed as Plint’s employer. The school was 
found to be conducted in accordance with Canada’s statutory obligations under 
the Indian Act.232  The court asserted that Canada exercised a high degree of 
control over virtually all aspects of the conduct of the residential school, 
excepting the religious instruction.233 Effectively, the court asserted that the 
Church’s only involvement in the schools was in regard to the provision of 
Christian education.234 In turn, it was asserted that as the role of the dormitory 
supervisors, including Plint, was not the provision of religious education, the  
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Church should not be seen as his employer and should not be liable for his 
acts.235 In addition, the court held in a rather bizarre manner that the Reverend 
Joblin, whose office was in the United Church’s Board of Home Missions, and 
who factually most appeared to be the school principal’s employer, was the 
agent of Canada, not the Church.236 Despite the United Church being Joblin’s 
employer, the court held that ‘for the most part, in supervising and directing [the 
school principal], Joblin was performing on behalf of Canada functions which 
were fundamentally those of Canada’.237 Effectively, the court held that Joblin 
and the Church, in providing supervision and management of the residential 
school, were acting as mere agents of Canada.238 
 
Secondly, the court held that except in the case of a true partnership, more than 
one person should not be held jointly vicariously liable for the tort of an 
employee.239  Finally, through a creative interpretation of Bazley v Curry240 the 
court invented a new doctrine of charitable immunity that was applied in this 
case to exempt the Church from liability. The court asserted that where the 
government is liable, and the non-profit organisation was not directly, but only 
vicariously, liable, the non-profit organisation should be immune from 
liability.241 As the Church was a non-profit charitable organisation and the 
plaintiffs could make full recovery against Canada, the Court of Appeal held 
that even if the Church was Plint’s employer the finding of liability against the 
Church should be reversed. 242 
 
All parties appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The primary focus of the 
court’s judgment in Blackwater v Plint (No 4)243was the issue of the Church’s 
vicarious liability and Canada’s liability for breach of non-delegable statutory 
duties. The plaintiffs’ appeal against the finding of no breach of the duty of care 
was rejected. The court asserted that there ‘was no evidence that the possibility  
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of sexual assault was actually brought to the attention of the people in charge of 
AIRS’.244 The court reiterated that the conduct had to be adjudged according to 
the standards of the time,245 adding sexual abuse was ‘an unthinkable idea at the 
time’.246 Adjudged according to the standards and awareness of the time, the 
court concluded the defendants ought not to have known of the risk of sexual 
abuse that arose in the context of the residential schools.247 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada reversed the court’s exemption of the Church in 
Blackwater v Plint (No 3),248 agreeing with the trial judge that both Canada and 
the Church were vicariously liable for Plint’s conduct.249 The court in 
Blackwater v Plint (No 4)250 noted that vicariously liability may extend to 
wrongful acts that are contrary to the employer’s desires. ‘Having created or 
enhanced the risk of the wrongful conduct’ it is appropriate that the employer be 
liable as this promotes deterrence while providing the injured with an adequate 
remedy.251  
 
More directly pertinent to the contrary findings in Blackwater v Plint (No 3),252 
the court agreed with the trial judge that the documentary evidence indicated 
that the Church was Plint’s immediate employer. 253 This included a reiteration 
that the Church was involved in all facets of the schools’ management (not just 
Christian education) and that it undertook such ‘for its own end of promoting 
Christian education to Aboriginal children’, not just for the Canadian 
government.254 The Church appointed, and was the direct supervisor of, the 
school principal.255 The principal was in turn responsible for the appointment of 
dormitory supervisors.256  
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The court also rejected the suggestion in Blackwater v Plint (No 3)257 that there 
could be no joint vicarious liability.258 The court agreed with the trial judge’s 
characterisation of the relationship between the Church and Canada as a 
partnership and held there was no jurisprudential reason for confining liability to 
one employer.259 In fact, to the contrary, the court asserted that an ‘arbitrary rule 
requiring only one employer for vicarious liability … would undermine the 
principles of fair compensation and deterrence’.260 
 
Finally on this point, the court in Blackwater v Plint (No 4)261 found there had 
been a ‘misapprehension’ on the part of the Court of Appeal in its interpretation 
of Bazley v Curry262 and in turn rejected the doctrine of charitable immunity.263  
 
As the court noted, this doctrine finds no support ‘in principle nor in the 
jurisprudence’ and ignores the concerns raised in Bazley v Curry264 itself that led 
to the court rejecting such a doctrine.265 This includes the need to encourage 
non-profit organisations to take precautions to screen their employees and 
protect children from sexual abuse. 266  
  
B Australia 
Kruger 
The plaintiffs in Kruger v Commonwealth267 sought to challenge the 
constitutional validity of the Aboriginal Ordinance 1918 (NT) discussed to 
some extent above. Under s 7 of the Ordinance the Chief Protector was 
appointed the legal guardian of every aboriginal and ‘half-caste’ child until the 
age of eighteen. This was notwithstanding the existence of a living parent or 
other relative. The Chief Protector was in turn entitled to ‘undertake the care 
and custody or control of any aboriginal or half-caste’. Under s 6 the Chief  
 
                                                 
257 Ibid [40]. 
258 Ibid [36]. 
259 Ibid [38]. 
260 Ibid. 
261 Ibid [40]. 
262 [1999] 2 SCR 534. 
263 (2005) 258 DLR (4th) 275, [44]. 
264 [1999] 2 SCR 534. 
265 (2005) 258 DLR (4th) 275, [41]. 
266 Ibid [41]. 
267 (1997) 146 ALR 125. 
2006                                                            The Stolen Generations 163 
 
Protector had a discretion to enter onto any premises and remove into his ‘care, 
custody, or control’ any aboriginal child or ‘half-caste’ child if ‘in his opinion 
it is necessary or desirable in the interests of the aboriginal or half-caste’. The 
power under s 16 was more absolute. Under s 16 the Chief Protector could 
cause any ‘aboriginal or half-caste’ to be removed to, and detained in, any 
reserve or aboriginal institution. There was no need for the formulation of an 
opinion as to what was in the aboriginal person’s best interests. A refusal to 
comply with such a removal order or a failure to remain on such reserve or 
aboriginal institution constituted an offence under the Ordinance. Under s 67 
the Northern Territory Administrator was authorised to make regulations that, 
in essence, effected the removal and detention of ‘aboriginals and half-castes’ 
under the Ordinance. 
 
The plaintiffs in Kruger v Commonwealth268 were aboriginal persons from the 
Northern Territory. Of the plaintiffs, five were removed as children from their 
families between 1925 and 1949 and detained as late as 1960. The sixth 
plaintiff, Mrs Rosie Napangardi McClary, was the mother of a child, Queenie 
Rose, who had been so removed from her family and detained in an aboriginal 
institution.  
 
As Toohey J explained, the plaintiffs’ submissions involved two steps.269 First, 
it was submitted that Parliament could not confer on the executive power to 
make laws that the Parliament could not validly enact. Second, for the reasons 
outlined below, Parliament itself could not have validly enacted the subject 
legislation. In turn, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutional validity of 
Aboriginal Ordinance, in particular ss 6, 7, 16 and 67. The Ordinance was said 
to be unconstitutional on a number of bases including that it: 
 
" was not a law for the government of the Northern Territory and 
thus was not authorised by Constitution Act 1901 (UK) s 122 
(the ‘territories’ power); 
" exceeded the scope of Commonwealth legislative power, 
whether that be under s 122 or otherwise, as the Constitution 
does not extend to laws authorising genocide and crimes 
against humanity; 
" purported to confer judicial power on persons other than 
federal courts, contrary to Constitution Act 1901 (UK) Chap 
III; 
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" breached an implied  constitutional freedom against being  
removed and detained without the benefit of the due process of 
law; 
" breached an implied constitutional right of equality under the 
law; 
" breached an implied constitutional freedom of movement and 
association; and 
" breached Constitution Act 1901 (UK) s 116 that protects the 
free exercise of religion. 
 
In turn the plaintiffs sought damages for their personal, cultural, spiritual and 
financial losses and the losses stemming from their consequent inability to 
participate in aboriginal land claims. By way of explaining the latter point, the 
removal of aboriginal children from their communities effected a break in the 
required270 continuous connection with traditional aboriginal lands and thus 
prevented them bringing a claim under, inter alia, the Aboriginal Land Rights 
(Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) and Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).271 
 
In defence the Commonwealth pleaded that the Ordinance was a valid law for 
the government of the Northern Territory. It denied that its legislative power 
under s 122 was constrained by s 116 or any of the implied constitutional 
protections  pleaded by the plaintiffs. In the alternative, if s 122 was so 
constrained, the Commonwealth asserted that the Ordinance did not breach s 
116 or the implied prohibitions as it was ‘enacted and amended for the purpose 
of the protection and preservation of persons of the Aboriginal race’ and was 
appropriate and adapted to that purpose. 
 
In the course of the High Court’s judgment Brennan CJ noted that the 
revelations ‘of the ways in which the powers conferred by the Ordinance 
[facilitating the institutionalisation of part-aboriginal children] were exercised 
in many cases has profoundly distressed the nation’.272 Similarly, Gaudron J 
asserted it was ‘clearly correct’ that the Ordinance had ‘authorised gross 
violations of the rights and liberties of Aboriginal Australians’.273  However, a 
theme that permeated the judgments was that a misuse of power or an  
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unreasonable exercise of power did not affect the validity of the subject 
provisions.274 What was being challenged in this case was the validity of the 
legislation, not whether the powers conferred had been abused.275 
 
A majority of the High Court276 held that the Ordinance was not invalid. 
Brennan CJ,277  Dawson278 (with whom McHugh J agreed279) and Gummow 
JJ280 rejected the existence of the alleged implied constitutional freedoms. 
Gaudron J, while accepting ‘there is a limited constitutional guarantee of 
equality before the courts’, rejected the existence of any implied immunity 
from discriminatory laws.281  
 
However, Gaudron J held that s 122 was subject to an implied constitutional 
freedom of movement and association that derived from the accepted implied 
constitution freedom of political communication.282 Brennan CJ283 and Dawson 
J284 held that s 122 extended to the Commonwealth an absolute legislative 
power that was not subject to any express or implied constitutional prohibition. 
Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ disagreed, asserting that s 122 was not 
necessarily immune from express (s 116) or implied constitutional 
protections.285 If s 122 was subject to the alleged constitutional rights, Brennan 
CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ asserted that they had not been violated. 
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Toohey and Gummow JJ asserted that while the effect of the Ordinance had 
been to impair, or even prohibit, the spiritual beliefs and practices of aboriginal 
persons, that was not its purpose and thus the Ordinance was not invalidated by 
s 116.286 Similarly, in regard to the implied constitutional protections of 
freedom of movement and association and legal equality Toohey J held in light 
of the prevailing views of the time and the welfare nature of the Ordinance the 
infringement of the subject freedom may be said to be a justified means of 
protecting aboriginal persons.287 Gaudron J rejected these conclusions. The 
‘removal from their communities and their traditional lands’ effected by the 
Ordinance ‘would, necessarily, have prevented the free exercise of their 
religion’, if such a religion was established.288  In turn, the Ordinance may have 
breached s 116 as one of its purposes was to remove ‘Aboriginal children from 
their families and communities, thereby preventing them from participating in 
community practices’, including religious practices.289 Moreover, Gaudron J 
believed that the Ordinance breached the implied constitutional freedom of 
movement and association.290 Sections 6, 16 and 67 all conferred powers which 
if exercised, operated directly to prevent the freedom of movement and 
association.291 Moreover, Gaudron J rejected the suggestion that the legislation 
could be justified as ‘necessary for the protection or preservation of Aboriginal 
people’.292  
 
Specifically in regard to the claim of genocide, the court rejected the 
suggestion that the Ordinance was intended to authorise actions that were 
intended to destroy the aboriginal people as a race, contrary to the Genocide 
Convention 1951. The court asserted that the intention to commit genocide,293 
as opposed to the actuality of effecting genocide, was important in terms of the 
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validity of the legislation.294 As the court believed that the view at the time295 
was that it was in the best interests of aboriginal children to remove them from 
their families, the Ordinance could not be seen as intending to authorise 
genocide.296 Gummow J asserted that the Ordinance was indicative of a 
concern ‘to assist survival rather than destruction’.297 
 
Nor was s 122 constrained by Chapter III according to Brennan CJ and Dawson 
J. It was suggested that Chapter III pertains to federal courts and territory 
courts were not federal court.298 The territories power in s 122 was also 
asserted to constitute a non-federal matter.299 Even if s 122 were so constrained 
as Gaudron,300 Toohey and Gummow JJ contended,301 in light of the welfare 
purpose stated in the Ordinance, the court held that the decision to remove the 
plaintiffs and the action taken to effect such a decision, were not necessarily 
judicial functions in breach of Chapter III.302 
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and this could extend to the territories: ibid 171. 
299 Ibid 142 (Brennan CJ). 
300 Gaudron J believed the protection did not derive from Chap III, but rather was 
implicit in s 51 as a law ‘authorising detention in custody, divorced from any breach 
of the law, is not a law on a topic with respect to which s 51 confers legislative 
power’: ibid 192-193.  
301 Ibid 171 (Toohey J); ibid 234 and 237-242 (Gummow J). 
302 Ibid 154 (Dawson J). See also ibid 172 (Toohey J); ibid 192-193 (Gaudron J); ibid 
234 (Gummow J). 
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Moreover, the court asserted that a breach of any alleged constitutional rights 
gave rise to no direct entitlement to damages.303 The common law was said to 
provide adequate remedies and thus there was no need to ‘invent a new cause 
of action’.304 
  
Williams (No 1), (No 2) and (No 3) 
The plaintiff in Williams v Minister, Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (No 
1),305 (No 2)306 and (No 3)307 was of aboriginal descent. Following her birth in 
the early 1940s she was placed, on her mother’s request, under the control of 
the Aboriginal Welfare Board under Aborigines Protection Act 1909 (NSW) s 
7(2).  The Board placed the plaintiff with the United Aborigines Mission at an 
Aboriginal Children’s Home, Bomaderry Children’s Home in New South 
Wales. At the age of 4 years, because of her ‘fair skinned’ appearance, she was 
transferred to another home, Lutanda Children’s Home, conducted by the 
Plymouth Brethren faith for ‘white’ children of European background. The 
plaintiff subsequently learned of her aboriginality and asserted that the 
revelation caused her considerable distress as she was told she had ‘mud in her 
veins’.308 At the age of 18 years the plaintiff left Lutanda and ‘entered into a 
period of her life that was disturbed and extremely unhappy’.309 This included 
periods of admission to hospital for psychological disorders which, she alleged, 
stemmed from her removal as an infant from a ‘supportive Aboriginal 
environment’.310 The plaintiff asserted that the Board had failed to provide for 
her custody, maintenance and education and, she alleged, that in consequence 
of these childhood experiences she suffered a personality disorder. She further 
claimed that she had been denied bonding and attachment and had been a 
victim of maternal deprivation and as a consequence suffered a disorder of 
attachment. In turn the plaintiff sought damages for negligence, breach of 
fiduciary duty, breach of statutory duty and for trespass. The plaintiff  
 
 
                                                 
303  Ibid 142 (Brennan CJ); ibid 179 (Toohey J); ibid 204-205 (Gaudron J); ibid 222-
223 (Gummow J). 
304 Ibid 205 (Gaudron J). 
305 (1994) 35 NSWLR 497. 
306 [1999] NSWSC 843. 
307 [2000] Aust Torts Rep 64,136. 
308 (1994) 35 NSWLR 497, 501. 
309 Ibid 502. The judgment details the plaintiff’s life as a vagrant, turning to 
prostitution and petty crime to support herself. 
310 Ibid.  
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commenced these legal proceedings in 1993 pursuant to a request for an 
extension of time under the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW).  
 
The plaintiff was granted an order under Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 60(G) 
extending the period in which to bring her proceedings against the defendants. 
Kirby P asserted that it would not be ‘just and reasonable’ to deny the plaintiff 
the opportunity to prove her case.311 ‘It will then have been determined as our 
system of law provided to all Australians – Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal – 
according to law, in open court and on its merits’.312 Kirby P found that the 
Aboriginal Welfare Board was, ‘arguably, obliged to Ms Williams to act in her 
interest and in a way that truly provided, in a manner apt for a fiduciary, for her 
‘custody, maintenance and education’.313 Kirby P added that it was ‘distinctly 
arguable that a person who suffers as a result of want of proper care on the part 
of the fiduciary may recover equitable compensation for losses occasioned by 
want of care’.314 In this regard Kirby P followed the Canadian decision M(K) v 
M(H),315 asserting that while in this case there was no economic loss, only a 
human, personal loss, the breach of fiduciary duties was nevertheless 
arguable.316  
 
When the case went to trial in Williams v Minister, Aboriginal Land Rights Act 
1983 (No 2)317 Abadee J rejected the plaintiff’s claims. In regard to the claim of 
breach of fiduciary duty, while ultimately Abadee J assumed for the purposes 
of the litigation that the parent/child or ward/guardian relationship was 
fiduciary in nature, he held there had been no breach. Abadee J rejected the 
relevant Canadian case law that had been followed by Kirby P in Williams v 
Minister, Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (No 1)318 including, relevantly, 
Mowatt.319 In turn he held that the plaintiff could not claim a breach of 
fiduciary duties in addition to her tortious claim and asserted further that only 
economic loss could be compensated in equity.320  Abadee J concluded that as  
 
 
                                                 
311 Ibid 514.  
312 Ibid.  
313 Ibid 511.  
314 Ibid.  
315 (1992) 96 DLR (4th) 289. 
316 (1994) 35 NSWLR 497, 511.  
317 [1999] NSWSC 843. 
318 (1994) 35 NSWLR 497. 
319 [1999] 11 WWR 301. 
320 [1999] NSWSC 843, [704], [729], [731] and [733]. 
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there were ‘no economic interests at stake’ a fiduciary duty should not be 
extended to the circumstances.321 In regard to the duty of care, for policy 
reasons, particularly the potential for a ‘floodgate’ of litigation, Abadee J 
refused to find that a duty of care was owed to an institutionalised child. 
 
Abadee J’s judgment was upheld on appeal in Williams v Minister, Aboriginal 
Land Rights Act 1983 (No 3).322 The court noted that the plaintiff’s case 
suffered from an ‘insuperable causation problem’.323 While the plaintiff had 
claimed that if the Board had taken her to a Child Guidance Clinic before 1960 
she would not have suffered a psychiatric disorder, she did in fact go to a clinic 
in 1960 and no such disorder was diagnosed. The Court of Appeal also agreed 
with Abadee J’s policy concerns in refusing to recognise a duty of care, noting 
that such a conclusion would potentially have a wide impact. 324 
 
Cubillo (No 1), (No 2) and (No 3) 
The plaintiffs, Mrs Cubillo and Mr Gunner, were part-aboriginal persons who 
were removed from their families as children and detained in institutions 
against their will.  
 
In 1947, Mrs Cubillo, then aged eight, was living in the Phillip Creek Native 
Settlement in Northern Territory, with her Aunt Maisie. Mrs Cubillo and 15 or 
16 other children ‘were loaded onto the truck’ and taken to the Retta Dixon 
Home for part-aboriginal children located on an aboriginal reserve in 
Darwin.325 The removal was effected by Mr Les Penhall, a cadet patrol officer, 
and an employee of the Native Affairs Branch and Miss Amelia Shankelton, 
the Superintendent of the Retta Dixon Home.326 Under Aboriginals Ordinance 
1918 (Cth) s 7 the Director of Native Affairs, a Commonwealth public servant, 
was the legal guardian of every aboriginal person. Under Aboriginals 
Ordinance 1918 (Cth) s 6 the Director of Native Affairs was authorised to 
undertake the care, custody and control of a part-aboriginal child if, in the 
Director’s opinion, it was necessary or desirable in the interests of the child. 
O’Loughlin J recognised that this power could be exercised ‘almost without  
 
                                                 
321 Ibid [754]. 
322 [2000] Aust Torts Rep 64,136. 
323 Ibid 64,175. 
324 Ibid 64,176-64,177. Note that on appeal the plaintiff had essentially abandoned 
the claim for breach of fiduciary duty: ibid 64,147. 
325 Cubillo 2 [2000] FCA 1084, [429]. 
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restraint’.327 There was no need for a court order. There was no need for a 
warrant.328 Moreover, as the court noted, the law permitted the Director to so 
remove the child against the express wishes of the child’s family.329 Ultimately, 
and somewhat inconsistently, O’Loughlin J concluded that on the evidence he 
was unable to conclude one way or the other regarding the issue of 
parental/carer consent to the removal of the children. As Mrs Cubillo bore the 
burden of proof,  O’Loughlin J held she had ‘failed to establish that she was, at 
that time, in the care of an adult aboriginal person, (such as Maisie) whose 
consent to her removal was not obtained’.330  
 
The Retta Dixon Home was established in 1946 by the Aborigines Inland 
Mission of Australia (‘AIMA’), a Protestant inter-denominational faith mission. 
In time it was recognised by the Northern Territory Administrator as an official 
‘Aboriginal Institution’.331 In 1953 a committal order was made by the Director 
of Native Affairs under Aboriginals Ordinance 1918 (Cth) s 16 committing Mrs 
Cubillo to the custody of the Retta Dixon Home until she was 18. Mrs Cubillo 
gave evidence as to the harsh treatment she suffered at the home and the court 
accepted that one of the male missionaries, Mr Des Walter, had, inter alia, 
viciously beaten her with the buckle of his trouser belt.332 In consequence of this 
beating, Mrs Cubillo sustained lacerations to her hands, face and one breast, 
partially severing one nipple.333 Written reports to the Native Affairs Branch 
referred to incidents when Mr Walter had beaten the children.334  
 
                                                 
327 Cubillo 2 ibid [144].  
328 Cubillo 2 ibid.  
329 Cubillo 2 ibid [4].  
330 Cubillo 2 ibid [440], [511] and [1538]-[1539].  
331 See Cubillo 1 [1999] FCA 518 [25] and [26;] Cubillo 2 ibid [1], [10] and [514]. 
332 Cubillo 2 ibid [10], [11], [30], [677], [678], [682], [687], [705], [729] and [1156].   
333 Cubillo 2 ibid.  
334For example, there were reports in the Native Affairs Branch’s files expressing 
concerns as to Mr Walter’s propensity for violence. There was the report of Mr 
Dentith, the Superintendent of the Bagot Reserve, to Mr McCaffrey the Acting 
Director of Native Affairs, dated 27 July 1954 that concerned young boys who had 
been flogged by Mr Matthews and Mr Walter several days earlier. There was the 
report of Mr McCaffrey to the Administrator under cover of a memorandum dated 28 
July 1954 concerning the conduct of Mr Matthews and Mr Walter, (with a 
handwritten notation of the Administrator on that memorandum). There was also the 
report of Mr Dentith to the District Superintendent, Native Affairs Branch dated 27 
October 1954 concerning an attack by Mr Walter upon another young boy: Cubillo 2 
ibid [664], [668], [669], [671], [672] and [674]; Cubillo 3 [2001] FCA 1213, [126]-
[129], [333] and [382]. 
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In May 1956, Mr Gunner, then aged seven was taken from the station where he 
lived with his family and was ultimately admitted to St Mary’s hostel, near 
Alice Springs. The hostel was run by the Australian Board of Missions and 
again was an official Aboriginal Institution.335 The removal was made on the 
recommendation of Mr Kitching, a Patrol Officer in the employ of the Native 
Affairs Branch of the Northern Territory Administration. The evidence of a 
witness, Mr Skinner, was to the effect that Mr Gunner was forcibly taken 
against his will. There were, however, reports written by Mr Harry Kitching that 
indicated that Topsy Kundrilba, Mr Gunner’s mother, agreed to Mr Gunner 
being removed. Among the court documents was a ‘Form of consent by a 
Parent’ containing a thumbprint that was said to be that of Mr Gunner’s mother. 
While the court accepted there was no way of knowing if Topsy Kundrilba 
understood this document,336 O’Loughlin J ultimately accepted that Mr 
Gunner’s mother had in fact consented to his removal.337 Interestingly, at one 
point from this thumbprint, allegedly that of Mr Gunner’s mother,338  
O’Loughlin J concluded that Topsy Kundrilba had consented to his removal so 
that he might obtain a ‘western education’.339 
 
In 1956 a committal order was made by the Director of Native Affairs under 
Aboriginals Ordinance 1918 (Cth) s 16 committing Mr Gunner to the custody of 
St Mary’s until his 18th birthday in 1966. Again, under Aboriginals Ordinance 
1918 (Cth) s 7 the Director of Native Affairs was the legal guardian of every 
aboriginal person. A further committal order in the same terms was made in 
February 1957 and in May 1957 the Northern Territory Administrator declared 
Mr Gunner to be a ward pursuant to Welfare Ordinance 1953 (Cth) s 14.340  
 
                                                 
335 Cubillo 1 [1999] FCA 518, [27] and [28]; Cubillo 2 ibid [12], [744] and [1156]. 
336 See Cubillo 2 ibid [782] and [787]. However, the court asserted: ‘I have no 
mandate to assume that Topsy … did not understand the meaning and effect of the 
document’: Cubillo 2 ibid [788]. 
337 Cubillo 1 [1999] FCA 518, [28]; Cubillo 2 ibid [13], [787], [782], [788], [790], 
[806], [807], [838] and [1133]. Thus the court asserted: ‘I have no mandate to assume 
that Topsy did not apply her thumb or that she, having applied her thumb, did not 
understand the meaning and effect of the document’: Cubillo 2 ibid [788]. 
338 The court at times refers to the thumbprint ‘allegedly’ being Topsy Kundrilba’s: 
Cubillo 2 ibid [784]. However, the court then later asserted: ‘I have no mandate to 
assume that Topsy did not apply her thumb …’: Cubillo 2 ibid [788]. 
339 Cubillo 2 ibid [1233]. 
340 See Cubillo 2 ibid [155], [789] and [839]. Note, while this legislation was not 
expressly confined to persons of aboriginal heritage, as it excepted from its legislative 
reach persons entitled to vote, only aboriginal persons fell into the class of persons 
that could be declared wards: HREOC above n 1, 646. 
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Under the Welfare Ordinance 1953 (Cth) the Director of Welfare was made the 
legal guardian of all wards. 
 
By the end of 1956 the Director of Welfare and the Northern Territory 
Administrator were expressing grave concerns about the staff and management 
at St Mary’s Hostel. The hostel was inadequately staffed and the facilities were 
inadequate and unhygienic. In this regard it should be noted that Mr Gunner also 
alleged that he was ill-treated whilst he was at St Mary’s. In particular, the court 
accepted that Mr Gunner (and four other witnesses) had been sexually assaulted 
by one of the missionaries, Mr Kevin Constable, and that he had suffered cruel 
beatings.341  
 
Mr Gunner remained at the hostel until February 1963. At this point, when he 
was about 14, ‘he was taken from St Mary’s to Angas Downs … a cattle station, 
about 250 kilometres to the south of Alice Springs’. Mr Gunner stayed at Angas 
Downs doing stock work until 1965 when the owner, Mr Liddle, told him that 
he could leave. Mr Gunner said that ‘he was taken by Mr Liddle to Alice 
Springs and left there to fend for himself’. O’Loughlin J held that ‘there was 
nothing in the evidence to suggest that the Director was ‘detaining’ Mr Gunner 
whilst he was at Angas Downs’.342 
 
Cubillo 1343 involved a preliminary application by the Commonwealth for 
summary dismissal of the plaintiffs’ cases on the basis that they had no causes 
of action against the Commonwealth and that their actions were statute barred 
and barred under the equitable doctrine of laches. Subject to certain comments 
on deficiencies in the plaintiff’s pleadings, O’Loughlin J rejected the 
Commonwealth application. 
 
In Cubillo 2344 O’Loughlin J held that the psychiatric illnesses the plaintiffs 
suffered stemmed from their removal, detention and deprivation from their 
family, rather than the conditions at the institutions or being assaulted whilst 
detained. Thus it was necessary for him to find the plaintiffs’ removal, rather  
 
                                                 
341 Cubillo 1 [1999] FCA 518, [30]; Cubillo 2 ibid [14], [60], [348], [899]-[905], 
[907]-[908], [946], [955], [960], [965], [974], [985], [989]-[990], [992]-[994], [1028], 
[1034], [1050], [1063], [1066] and [1073]. 
342 Cubillo 2 ibid [1150]. See Cubillo 1 ibid [32]; Cubillo 2 ibid [27] and [909]-[913]. 
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than the assaults, to be a breach, for any damages to be awarded. Ultimately 
O’Loughlin J rejected the plaintiffs’ claims with respect to all causes of 
action.345  A theme throughout the judgment in regard to the various causes of 
action was that the removal and detention of the plaintiffs was lawful because it 
was believed to be in the [then] child’s best interests and, as the plaintiffs bore 
the onus of proof, they had failed to show that they were taken without the 
consent of their parents/guardians.346  
 
The court held that neither the Directors, nor the Commonwealth, owed 
Mrs Cubillo or Mr Gunner a duty of care. In essence, O’Loughlin J asserted that 
no duty of care arose from the role of carer of the aboriginal children that had 
been removed and detained.347 In regard to the Directors’ statutory duties to care 
for aboriginal children,348 O’Loughlin J held that these duties were not 
mandatory and thus gave rise to no duty of care.349  
 
O’Loughlin J concluded that even if the Commonwealth had owed the plaintiffs 
a duty of care, there had been no breach of that duty. As the plaintiffs had never 
told anyone in authority about what had occurred, O’Loughlin J held that there 
was no evidence that either the Directors or the Commonwealth knew, or ought 
to have known, of the assaults or the assailants’ propensities to such conduct. 
Moreover, even if there had been any breach by the relevant Directors, 
O’Loughlin J asserted that the Commonwealth could not be held vicariously 
liable because of the ‘independent discretion rule’.350 Thus O’Loughlin J 
believed that the relevant statutory regime granted the Directors an independent 
discretion as to whether an aboriginal child should be removed from their family 
and placed in care.351 This consequently prevented the Commonwealth being 
vicariously liable for any breach of the duties by the Directors within the 
statutory frameworks.352 In addition, the Superintendents of the institutions 
where the plaintiffs were held were found not to be agents of the 
Commonwealth.353 
                                                 
345 Cubillo 2 ibid [656], [1244], [1247], [1481]-[1485], [1488], [1536], [1540], [1541] 
and [1563]. 
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O’Loughlin J held that no fiduciary relationship existed between the plaintiffs 
and the Commonwealth. He held that a fiduciary duty could not exist where a 
claim was also made in tort.354 Moreover, as there had been no economic loss 
by the plaintiffs, only physical and psychological damage, no equitable 
damages could be claimed.355  
 
O’Loughlin J also refused to grant the plaintiffs an extension of time to bring 
both their common law claims (wrongful imprisonment and breach of duty of 
care) and equitable claim breach of fiduciary duty) on the basis that the 
Commonwealth had suffered ‘remediable prejudice’ in defending the 
proceedings because with the lapse of time potential witnesses had died or 
were unavailable because of poor health.356  
 
On appeal the Full Court upheld O’Loughlin J’s findings of fact and asserted 
that he had not erred in law.357 The court also concluded that it was open to 
O’Loughlin J to find that both the plaintiffs/appellants’ common law claims 
and equitable claims were barred because of the lapse of time. The court did 
note, however, some disagreement with O’Loughlin J’s conclusion that there 
was no evidence that either the Directors or the Commonwealth knew, or ought 
to have known, of Mr Walter’s assaults of the children.358 The Full Court 
asserted that in light of the relevant reports ‘there may be some difficulty with 
his finding that there was no evidence that the Commonwealth knew, or ought 
to have known, that Mr Walter was prone to violence towards children’.359  
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In addition, a number of the plaintiffs’ submissions on appeal were rejected as 
new claims that had not previously been pleaded or argued at trial.360 The Full 
Court held that these new claims could not be brought on appeal as O’Loughlin 
J had not made relevant findings of fact and the Commonwealth would be 
prejudiced as it had not had the opportunity to present evidence in defence of 
such claims.361  
 
IV CONCLUSION 
 
One cannot help but despair at the difference in approach taken to the plight of 
the stolen generations by the Australian and Canadian governments. The 
Cubillo decisions are just part of a broader issue as to how/whether the stolen 
generation in Australian will obtain justice. The federal Australian government 
appears to want to deny these events happened and as the litigation in Cubillo 1 
evidences, will use every mechanism available to it to frustrate potential 
plaintiffs. By contrast, the Canadian government has apologised for the 
aboriginal residential school experience. In litigation it has waived potential 
defences of statute of limitations and laches; defences that the Australian 
government has sought to utilise with great vigour. Similarly, in settlement 
negotiations, potential defences of statute of limitations and laches are not used 
by the Canadian federal government to reduce amounts of compensation 
offered. Most importantly, the Canadian government has recently agreed to a 
considerable compensation package that will appropriately take these matters 
out of the adversarial forum of the courts. 
 
From the above discussion it will be apparent that the inability of Australian 
aboriginal plaintiffs to successfully claim damages is not purely a political 
matter.  Judicial doctrines have also been used to prevent recourse through the 
Australian courts. Unlike in Australia, however, the above discussion details 
how some Canadian aboriginal claimants have successfully brought actions for 
compensation against, inter alia, the federal Canadian government for the 
damages stemming from their experiences in the aboriginal residential  
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schools.362 While the plaintiffs in these leading Canadian cases were ultimately 
successful under at least one of their heads of claim, the approaches in these 
cases in regard to the Crown’s liability for breaching fiduciary duties,363 
breaching the duty of care364 and breaching non-delegable duties365 are 
inconsistent. Thus even in the Canadian jurisprudence key legal issues 
pertaining to the Crown’s liability for the aboriginal residential school 
experience continue to be unresolved. The resolution of these issues will have 
to await further litigation, if any, taken by aboriginal claimants outside the 
negotiated settlement package. 366 
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